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As the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the world, requiring emergency management by 
health authorities and providers, it created flow-on crises and ‘crisis contagion’ for 
organizations ranging from international airlines and tourism operators to local businesses, 
schools, and universities. In addition to the risks directly associated with the health emergency, 
many organizations were plunged into crisis because of severe restrictions to their operations 
and income losses. This analysis examines crisis communication in an organization faced with 
major financial losses, staff redundancies, and disruption. It analyses how these and necessary 
crisis responses were communicated to stakeholders, using situational crisis communication 
theory (SCCT), as its analytical framework. While noting alternative perspectives such as crisis 
and emergency risk communication (CERC) theory, SCCT is identified as the most widely 
applied theory of crisis communication, and thus warrants ongoing review in an era of media 
fragmentation, disinformation, and low public trust. Furthermore, this analysis provides a 
relatively rare ‘inside’ (emic) perspective through ethnography and autoethnography conducted 
by a senior decision-maker in the organization studied, which expands traditional outside (etic) 
perspectives and offers new insights into crisis communication. 
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1.   The unprecedented COVID-19 crisis—and its related crises 
 
COVID-19, a highly infectious coronavirus,1 caused the largest global crisis in terms of human 
health risk, impact on economies, and social and political upheaval since the Second World 
War. This particular strain of coronavirus, which was first reported in Wuhan City in Hubei 
Province, China in December 2019 (thus named COVID-19), spread rapidly to more than 100 
countries by March 2020 and was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) on 11 March 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020a). 
As widely reported, the pandemic led to an almost complete shutdown of all but essential 
services and businesses in hundreds of cities; self-isolation by millions of people worldwide; 
and near overwhelming demands on health systems as hundreds of thousands of people became 
seriously ill, and many died. As 2020 drew to a close, infections were approaching 100 million 
and deaths neared two million worldwide (Worldometer, 2020).  
The virus, and attempts to contain it, in turn resulted in the loss of more than one billion 
jobs temporarily or permanently (International Labour Organization, 2020), as businesses and 
service providers closed down, leading to widespread economic hardship and escalating 
anxiety and even panic among populations. Compared with crises analyzed in academic 
literature over several decades, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on organizations in 
many sectors was unprecedented and beyond the scale of most crisis management and crisis 
communication case studies.  
COVID-19 undoubtedly will be the subject of numerous studies from an emergency 
management and health perspective. The focus of this analysis is not emergency management 
of the pandemic or health communication, but the communication challenges of an 
organization in coping with major disruption to and adjustment of its operations caused by 
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emergency response strategies such as travel restrictions and ‘lockdowns’ of workplaces and 
various services.  
The spread of COVID-19 resulted in ‘crisis contagion’ as well as viral contagion, as its 
effects ‘spilled over from one organization to another’ (Laufer and Wang, 2018: 173) and 
resulted in events and circumstances that created major negative impacts and challenges for 
many organizations. While initially and centrally a health emergency, the pandemic rapidly 
spread causing a range of ‘knock on’ impacts. What is analyzed here is organizational 
management and communication related to the chronic operational, financial, and potential 
reputational crisis faced by a large public sector organization caught in crisis contagion (see 
2.1, ‘Understanding what constitutes as crisis’).  
In this instance, the organization studied is in Australia, a country that responded early and 
strongly to the declaration of the pandemic. Australia banned international travel except in 
special circumstances such as repatriation of citizens; organizations other than essential 
services were ordered to direct staff to work from home; and complete lockdowns were 
implemented in ‘hot spots’ of community transmission, including entire cities in some cases. 
Such emergency management strategies were seen as necessary and they restricted COVID-19 
infections in Australia to 28,408 and deaths to just over 900 as at the end of 2020 (Department 
of Health, 2020). However, there were potentially catastrophic financial and operational 
impacts and reputational damage for organizations if they did not implement effective crisis 
management and crisis communication, as will be explained.  
A feature of this analysis is that it is based on an emic autoethnographic and ethnographic 
approach that accesses an ‘inside’ perspective from a participant directly involved in decision-
making and communication. This afforded a ‘close up’ perspective (Heide et al., 2018: 454), 
in contrast with the vast majority of studies of crisis management and crisis communication 
that are undertaken from an outside observer or independent analyst (etic) standpoint. The 
benefits of this approach are discussed under ‘Methodology’ and in the findings. 
 
2.  The theory of crisis management and crisis communication 
 
2.1 Understanding what constitutes a crisis 
In the foreword to the Handbook of Crisis Communication, Heath (2010: 3) notes that around 
20 definitions of a crisis have emerged in public relations and corporate communication 
literature. In a chapter of the handbook, Coombs lists eight of these, but in discussing ‘key 
definitions of a crisis’, he settles on his own 2007 definition in which he described a crisis as 
‘an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of stakeholders and can seriously 
impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes’ (Coombs, 2007a: 2–
3). Elsewhere, Coombs describes a crisis as ‘a significant threat to operations that can have 
negative consequences if not handled properly’ (Coombs, 2007b: para. 2, 2014b: para. 3). 
Coombs does note that, as well as causing financial and reputational damage for organizations, 
crises can cause public harm such as injuries or loss of lives (2014: para. 3). However, evident 
in these definitions and in most public relations and corporate communication literature is a 
focus on crises as an event, or event related, and on the effects of crises on organizations and 
communication to protect the interests of organizations. In an extensive review of crisis 
management and communication literature, Kent observed that ‘nearly every conference paper 
and article implicitly or explicitly treats crisis from the standpoint of the organization’ (2010: 
705). 
Political scientists and emergency and disaster management specialists define a crisis more 
broadly as ‘a phase of disorder in the development of a person, an organization, a community, 
an ecosystem, a business sector, or a polity’ (Boin et al., 2017: 5). Sociological studies also 
examine crises through a wider lens, focusing on risks to individuals, groups, communities, or 
social systems and society as a whole. Anthropological literature, in particular, presents a 
different perspective to Coombs’ association of a crisis with an event, defining a crisis as 
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‘conditions’ in which ‘people (including the ‘state’s agents’) must cope with a variety of 
unexpected disruptions’ (Greenhouse, 2002: 8). These broader concepts of crisis are useful in 
examining the range of disruptions and conditions with which people and organizations had to 
cope following the outbreak of COVID-19.  
 
2.2 Types of crises 
Lerbinger (1997) identified eight types of crisis as (1) natural disaster; (2) technological crisis; 
(3) confrontation; (4) malevolence; (5) organizational misdeeds; (6) workplace violence; (7) 
rumours; and (8) terrorist attacks and other ‘man-made’ disasters. 
In his extensive writing on crisis management and communication, Coombs (e.g., 2007a, 
2007c, 2015, 2018) has identified a similar range of crisis events and categorized them into 
three types based on the likely attribution of blame and public expectations in relation to 
response, which he terms crisis responsibility. 
While Lerbinger (2012) later grouped crisis events into three categories, which he labelled 
(1) physical crises caused by external factors beyond the control of the organization such as 
natural disasters and possibly including technological or biological crises; (2) human-climate 
crises created by an external stakeholder acting in conflict or malevolently; and (3) 
management failures, the events and effects examined in this analysis do not neatly fit into any 
of the above categories. The existential threat posed by a pandemic and its flow-on effects were 
not a ‘natural disaster’ by most definitions,2 and the range of impacts were not ‘man-made’. In 
recent writing, Coombs (2019) advocates a broader understanding of crises, but he continues 
to focus on organizational perspectives and interests.  
Coombs categorizes crises as (1) victim crises such as natural disasters, damaging false 
rumours, and product tampering by an external actor; (2) accidental crises such as industrial 
accidents beyond an organization’s control; and (3) intentional crises involving organizational 
misdeeds such as fraud, safety breaches, or negligence (2015: 264). He referred to the third 
category as preventable crises in his earlier work (Coombs, 2007c: 168). Based on attribution 
theory (Heider, 1958), Coombs goes on to argue that victim crises result in ‘very low 
attributions of crisis responsibility’ and that accidental crises result in ‘minimal attributions of 
crisis responsibility’, with only the intentional crisis cluster leading to ‘strong attributions of 
crisis responsibility’ and ‘severe reputational threat’ (2007c: 168; 2015: 264).  
 
2.3 Crisis communication 
The predominant body of theory in relation to crisis communication in public relations and 
corporate communication is situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007c, 
2015, 2018). Central to SCCT is identification of crisis response strategies for the three types 
of crisis identified by Coombs—natural disasters, accidental crises, and intentional crises. 
Coombs proposes four key crisis response strategies with 10 specific executions or sub-types, 
as shown in Table 1. 
The crisis response strategies proposed by Coombs are determined based on crisis 
responsibility and focused on avoidance of blame and resulting reputational damage. In this 
regard, SCCT notes that various intensifiers can exacerbate the level of responsibility, and 
therefore blame, attached to organizations. Intensifiers include the organization’s history of 
crises, its performance history (i.e., track record), and sometimes the severity of damage 
caused. A positive performance history and reputation does not bestow a ‘halo effect’ as 
often claimed, according to research. However, the converse—a poor track record and 
reputation—can result in a ‘Velcro effect’, according to Coombs (2015: 265). He argues that 
the presence of negative intensifiers such as a previous history of crises and/or poor 
performance can result in a victim crisis being viewed as an accidental crisis and an 
accidental crisis being viewed as an intentional crisis (Coombs, 2015: 265). 
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Table 1. Crisis response strategies proposed by Coombs (2015: 266). 
 
Response strategy Sub-types Management action 
Denial Denial Claim that no crisis occurred 
Attack accuser Confront the person or group claiming a crisis 
Scapegoat Blame some outside person or group 
Diminish Excuse Deny intent to do harm / claim inability to control events 
Justification Minimize the perceived damage caused 
Rebuild Compensation Offer money or other gifts to victims 
Apology Accept responsibility and ask stakeholders to forgive 
Bolstering Reminder Tell stakeholders about past good works 
 Ingratiation Thank or praise stakeholders for their help 
 Victimage Remind stakeholders that the organization is also a victim 
 
A further key feature of SCCT is that media coverage is seen as having a critical role in 
shaping the reputation of an organization before and during a crisis and as a channel of 
communication during and after a crisis (Coombs, 2015: 271). Drawing on turn-of-the-
millennium research by Deephouse (2000), Coombs says that ‘most of the information 
stakeholders learn about a corporation is derived from media reports’ (2015: 271). Other 
public relations researchers also pay considerable attention to media relations and publicity as 
part of crisis management and crisis communication (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2007; Verhoeven et 
al., 2014). Coombs does refer to the internet and intranets, but he has consistently highlighted 
news media as playing a key role (2007c: 164) and, in recent revisions of SCCT, has focussed 
on the role and impact of social media (Coombs, 2014b, 2018). 
Crisis communication theory is also influenced by studies of image restoration or repair 
(Benoit, 1995. Coombs, 2006), impression management (Coombs, 2006; Schwarz, 2008: 32), 
and apologia (Coombs, 2006, 2015; Frandsen and Johansen, 2010; Schwarz, 2008: 32)—a 
point noted by Arendt et al. (2017) in their study of more than 100 peer-reviewed articles on 
crisis communication. Coombs acknowledges that traditionally ‘study of crisis response 
strategies has been heavily skewed toward apologies’ (2015: 273). As well as illustrating a 
focus in public relations literature on the organization (e.g., its image), these theories further 
illustrate a focus on fault and defending against attribution of blame, or what Coombs calls 
‘crisis responsibility’ (2015: 267). 
There are also a number of functions and practices that are closely related to and 
sometimes overlap with crisis communication as it is theorized in public relations and 
corporate communication literature. These are briefly noted as context and as part of the 
analytical framework where they are applicable.  
 
2.4 Crisis management 
Crisis management and crisis communication are sometimes conflated and treated as 
synonymous. For example, public relations literature has often claimed that the function is 
responsible for crisis management (Fall, 2004). This is contestable and was incorrect in the 
case examined here, as will be explained. Nevertheless, the practices of crisis management 
and crisis communication are closely integrated. 
Coombs (2014a) says ‘crisis management is a process designed to prevent or lessen the 
damage a crisis can inflict on an organization and its stakeholders’ and he identifies three 
phases in crisis management as pre-crisis, crisis response, and post-crisis (para. 5). 
Significantly, this definition of crisis management extends recognition of those affected 
beyond the organization to stakeholders, as does that of Bundy et al., 2017), which defines 
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crisis management as ‘the process by which an organization deals with a disruptive and 
unexpected event that threatens to harm the organization or its stakeholders’ (2017: 1661). 
Boin et al. also observe that crisis management involves ‘a set of interrelated and 
extraordinary governance challenges’ (2017: 4). 
 
2.5 Crisis leadership 
Along with a number of leadership and management scholars, Boin et al. (2017) also 
highlight the importance of leadership in a crisis. In The Politics of Crisis Management: 
Public Leadership Under Pressure they say: ‘in … times of crisis, citizens look to their 
leaders … leaders are expected to chart pathways out of the crisis’ (2017: 3). Relevant to this 
analysis, they say: ‘The job of crisis leadership … is to limit the depth and duration of the 
chaos, bewilderment, helplessness, and anger that this tends to cause, and to mobilize and 
harness coping capacity from within the community’ (2017: 12).  
There is much focus on crisis ‘management’ in crisis literature. But leadership is 
identified as different to management in several key respects, such as having an outward 
versus inward focus and a focus on change and looking to the future rather than stability and 
preserving or re-establishing the status quo, which is a key focus of management (Lunenberg, 
2011). It can be argued that greater attention to leadership in a crisis is important. A first-
hand perspective of leadership, as discussed here, offers a contribution to such study.  
 
2.6 Emergency management 
Emergency management is related to crisis management to some extent, and some use the 
terms interchangeably. However, Boin et al. (2017), Haddow et al. (2017, Reynolds and 
Seeger (2005), and others identify emergency management with risk assessment, 
preparedness, and management of natural and technological hazards that require the 
intervention of emergency services, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, floods, wildfires, 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, dam failures, nuclear accidents, hazardous materials 
incidents, and terrorism, as well as disease outbreaks and pandemics. As this analysis is 
focussed on an organizational crisis triggered by emergency management measures, rather 
than management of the emergency, crisis management and crisis communication theory 
provide a more relevant analytical framework.  
 
2.7 Emergency and risk communication 
While Coombs (2014a) identifies pre-crisis communication as one of three stages, risk 
communication focusses on communication for minimizing risks and avoiding emergencies 
and disasters, such as through warnings and public education. Covello (1992: 359) defines 
risk communication as ‘the exchange of information among interested parties about the 
nature, magnitude, significance, or control of a risk’. Renn (2008) and others draw attention 
to the multiple dimensions and objectives, as well as the context, of risk and emergency 
communication, which can include persuasion (e.g., health advice), as well as responding to 
information seeking.  
Recently, Reynolds and Seeger argued that it is productive to combine crisis 
communication and risk communication. While noting differences, Reynolds and Seeger say 
that risk and crisis communication ‘have much in common and intersect at a variety of 
points’ (2005: 47). They note that public relations approaches to crisis communication are 
primarily focussed on crisis events and that they are mainly concerned with protecting the 
reputation of the organization. They propose instead a five-stage approach, which they call 
crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC), that takes a broader view of crises from 
pre-event stages to ‘eruption’ and then ‘post-mortem and clean up stages’ and addresses risks 
to society as well as key stakeholders. As noted, crisis communication literature addresses 
pre-event preparedness and post-crisis actions to some extent. However, given the focus of 
Reynolds and Seeger on developing a ‘comprehensive approach to emergency public health 
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events’ (2005: 44), and their specific reference to infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics 
as examples of a ‘chronic crisis’ that develops over longer periods of time than traditional 
event crises (p. 51), CERC is also relevant to this analysis. 
 
3.  Methodology: A ‘close up’ insider’s perspective 
 
This analysis stems from a situation in which the author, an academic researcher, was also a 
senior executive in a large Australian public sector organization responsible for leading and 
managing its operations during and following to the outbreak of COVID-19. The 
organization is a faculty of a university ranked in the ‘top 150’ in the world in 2020 by one of 
the leading ranking systems (Quacquarelli Symonds, 2020). The faculty, made up of two 
schools and eight research institutes and centres, had more than 4,000 students including 
more than 400 higher research degree students and almost 400 academic, administrative, and 
technical staff at the time. Thus, it represents an enterprise of significant size. Furthermore, 
the operations of the faculty are important in this context, being the Faculty of Science of the 
university specializing in life sciences including biology, medical microbiology, metabolic 
biochemistry, parasitology, and research to combat infectious diseases, as well as 
mathematical and computer sciences. Upon the outbreak of COVID-19, the faculty was 
required to continue a number of its operations not only to support students, but to maintain 
vital research into vaccines, testing, and immunology being undertaken in collaboration with 
universities and research institutes worldwide. Also, the faculty held bacterial and viral 
cultures, animals, and cadavers in its laboratories, which needed to be maintained in a 
hygienic and safe way. These factors presented a series of significant operational challenges 
as well as major risks in terms of physical health and safety, mental health and wellbeing, 
animal welfare, and financial sustainability. 
 
3.1 The site of research 
While having a disciplinary background in media and communication, the author was 
contracted as Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Science of the university prior to and during the 
outbreak of COVID-19, and was Acting Dean during the first critical weeks of the crisis in 
early 2020. Key response strategies were developed during this period, including the 
cancellation of all on-campus classes and moving more than 300 academic subjects and 4,000 
students to online learning; transitioning almost 90 per cent of staff to remote working; and 
managing sensitive issues such as the termination of many short-term and casual staff 
contracts. Also, several students tested positive to the coronavirus during the transition 
period, requiring urgent tracing of close contacts, isolation, cleaning, and communication in 
an environment of high anxiety and fear.  
After the initial peak period of activity following proclamation of the pandemic in early 
March 2020, the researcher continued as Deputy Dean and a member of the faculty executive 
team (FET)3 responsible, or jointly responsible, for high-level crisis management and 
communication throughout 2020.  
The Deputy Dean role also included membership of the university’s senior leaders’ 
group (SLG) and a number of university committees, involving leadership responsibilities 
and direct access to and participation in decision-making affecting the university’s 3,500 staff 
and 45,000 students in total. Thus, this analysis constitutes a ‘close-up’ study, which Heide at 
al. (2018: 454) identify as rare and needed to provide ‘richer and more varied empirical 
material’ in relation to strategic communication. 
 
3.2 An emic (insider) versus outside (etic) perspective  
As noted in the introduction, this analysis offers a different and important contribution to 
literature in the field from an emic (inside) perspective. While offering independent critique, 
the authors of crisis-related studies rarely if ever are a member of the senior executive team 
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responsible for an organization’s key decisions and its stance. Even when communication 
practitioners are part of the crisis management team (CMT) and give strategic advice as well 
as distribute information, the stance of an organization is determined by others. The stance of 
an organization is recognized in contingency theory as a fundamental determinant of what it 
does and says (i.e., strategy), and of stakeholder and public response (Cameron et al., 2008). 
In the case of crisis communication, Coombs notes that an organization’s stance ‘denotes 
how it responds to conflicts’ (2014a: 18). Thus, there is much to be learned from the first-
hand view of an ‘insider’ directly involved in making key decisions and statements in a crisis. 
 
3.3 Approach 
This emic analysis is based on a combination of ethnography and autoethnography 
undertaken within an interpretivist humanistic approach. As L’Etang et al. (2012) noted in an 
editorial in a special issue of Public Relations Review, ‘anthropology, and its methodological 
approach—ethnography—seem natural bedfellows for public relations scholarship and 
practice’ (p. 519), and the special issue advocated increased ethnographic as well as 
autoethnographic research. Waymer and Logan (2016) argue that autoethnography “has the 
potential to shed unique insights into the lived work experience of key organizational 
stakeholders” (p. 1458).  
As well as involving self-reflection on the author’s own experiences and actions, the 
discussion and conclusions are based on first-hand observation of decisions and actions taken 
by the various leadership and executive committees of the faculty and university during the 
series of major disruptions and unprecedented conditions that followed the outbreak of 
COVID-19.  
While some are critical of ethnography, and particularly autoethnography, on the 
grounds of subjectivity, ‘self-representation’ as discussed in the following, and a lack of 
empirical evidence in some cases (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008), a body of knowledge has 
accumulated to inform observation and self-reflection as valid qualitative research methods. 
Creswell defines ethnography is ‘a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher studies an 
intact cultural group in a natural setting over a prolonged period of time by collecting, 
primarily, observational and interview data’ (2009: 13). In addition to identifying observation 
as a primary research method used in ethnography, Geertz (1973) cited participation by the 
researcher in the activities studied as a valid contribution to data collection and reflective 
analysis. The result of first-hand observation and participation over a period of time results in 
what Geertz calls ‘thick description’—that is, a deeper level of understanding and analysis 
than that afforded by social science research methods such as self-reporting surveys and 
single-shot interviews. Elaborating on Geertz’s description, Neuman emphasizes that 
ethnography is ‘very detailed description of a ... culture from the viewpoint of an insider in 
the culture to facilitate understanding of it’ (2006: 381) [original emphasis]. 
In a review of authoethnography in an international encyclopedia of communication 
research, Adams et al. (2017) similarly note that autoethnographers can ‘articulate insider 
knowledge of cultural experience’ (p. 3) and also that ‘authoethnographers can write about 
experiences that happen in private’ (p. 4), which are invisible to outside researchers, and they 
can describe ‘how being there in the experience feels’, not simply report phenomena and facts 
(p. 3) [emphasis added]. In their call for attention to autoethnography, Waymer and Logan 
(2016) draw on Bullough and Pinnegar (2001) to point out that the methodology can 
“articulate ‘nodal moments’”; “provide fresh perspectives on established truths”; and identify 
“complication or tension” (p. 1463). 
Autoethnographers vary in their emphasis on auto (self), ethno (sociocultural 
connection), and graphy (the application of research methods and processes) (Wall, 2008: 
39). Researchers using autoethnography are urged to draw on empirical data as far as 
possible, rather than relying solely or largely on personal observations that can result in 
memoir or ego-driven representation to project their ‘self-worth’ (Tedlock, 2000: 468). The 
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‘self’ in autoethnography serves as the vantage point, which affords direct access to data that 
otherwise might not be available. What separates ethnographic and autoethnographic research 
from autobiographical stories and memoirs, according to Maréchal (2010), is reflexivity and 
the connection of observations to wider cultural, political, and social understandings. This 
connection involves supporting personal observation with records, correspondence, and other 
evidence, as noted in the following. 
 
3.4 Methods 
In addition to direct personal observation, ethnography and autoethnography are 
operationalized through the collection and analysis of documents such as journal notes and 
diaries. In an organizational context, records that support observation also include minutes of 
meetings, e-mails, reports, website and intranet statistics,4 and research such as surveys. 
During this research, a detailed diary was kept, along with extensive journal notes, and a 
range of the above organizational data sources were accessed, as reported under 
‘Observations, reflections, and discussion’.  
As noted by a number of qualitative researchers, observation in ethnography and 
autoethnography is also supported by interviews with key informants in some cases. In this 
case, formal interviews were not conducted because the researcher was in daily conversations 
and e-mail communication with all members of the FET and the university’s senior 
management, as well as staff and students. When ‘social distancing’5 was introduced, regular 
meetings were conducted via Zoom and Microsoft Teams. All online meetings and 
presentations were recorded and the Governance Manager of the faculty maintained an 
archive of all announcements, guidelines, and responses issued by the leadership team, 
affording a comprehensive record of decisions, actions and communications, as well as 
feedback from key stakeholders.  
The research proceeded inductively, as is common in ethnography and autoethnography, 
rather than in response to a series of research questions. The research sought in an open-
ended way to identify (1) the major challenges in dealing with the crisis; (2) the key strategic 
decisions and actions taken including their rationale; (3) the response and outcomes of those 
decisions and actions as far as could be determined; and (4) to compare these with crisis 
management and crisis communication theory. 
While this analysis is based on less than two years study, which Tedlock (2008: 151) 
recommends as ideal for ethnography, the nine months from March to December 2020 was 
an intense period in terms of management and communication in relation to changes and 
actions necessitated by COVID-19. Also, this analysis arguably provides ‘thick description’ 
because of the proximity of the researcher to ‘the action’.  
 
4.  Observations, reflections, and discussion 
 
The following analysis, based on observation, reflection and records, reviews key leadership, 
management, and communication initiatives in the context of the conceptualization and 
theorization of crisis management and crisis communication in the literature, with particular 
attention to communication.  
To understand the context of management decisions and communication, it is necessary 
to note that the national government closed the nation’s borders to all but returning citizens 
within days of declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic. This meant that more than 10,000 
international students enrolled at the university could not enter the country to commence or 
continue study in 2020, including more than 1,000 studying in the Faculty of Science. This 
resulted in a loss of more than $200 million of annual income to the university and a $12–15 
million annual loss to the faculty. Also, a range of health authority regulations and advisories 
were issued requiring physical distancing between people and restrictions on the size of 
gatherings. While universities were classified as essential services and exempted from some 
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restrictions, social responsibility as well as legal and operational imperatives guided 
management decisions. 
A single paper cannot discuss the extensive range of decisions and actions taken during 
the crisis. However, for broad context, some of the major operational initiatives implemented 
by the faculty in conjunction with university management, which had to be communicated to 
stakeholders, are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Key organization initiatives and issues that required communication. 
 
Stakeholder  Initiative Key decisions and actions 
Employees Social distancing  • 1.5 metre physical distancing policy implemented 
including in laboratories (see ‘Researcher safety’) 
• All non-essential travel cancelled  
• Self-isolation by any staff with symptoms, in 
accordance with government guidelines 
 Working from home • Directed staff to work from home unless involved 
in essential work (e.g., vaccine research; security) 
• Health and wellbeing advice for remote working 
provided on the staff intranet 
• IT infrastructure upgraded including expanded 
Zoom capacity and internet bandwidth 
 Researcher safety • Recalled all researchers working overseas 
• Deferred projects when possible, particularly close 
contact laboratory work  
• Additional personal protection equipment (PPE) 
provided in labs (i.e., gowns, masks, and gloves) 
 Laboratory safety • Delivery of cadavers to anatomy labs suspended  
• Emergency team established to protect cultures, 
animals, and chemicals in labs 
 Casual staff reduction • Casual staff contracts reduced by 30% due to 
reduction in weekly classes through conversion to 
online learning 
• Expiring short-term contracts not renewed 
• Casual staff ‘hardship fund’ established 
Students Remote / online learning • 300 subjects converted to online learning in four 
weeks. Included ‘low-tech’ solutions for students 
behind restrictive firewalls in China 
 International students  • Maintained contact with international students 
offshore, particularly in China 
• Offered online learning (as above) 
 Local students  • Subject Coordinators contacted all local students 
by e-mail with regular updates 
 Students tested positive • Telephone contact with students tested positive 
• Telephone contact with teaching staff in contact 
• E-mail communication to all students 
Financial Expenditure reductions • Recruitment freeze implemented immediately 
• 90% of planned capital expenditure postponed 
• Voluntary separation package (VSP) offered mid-
year. Reduced university staff by 357; reduced 
Science staff by 24 
• Additional 100–150 redundancies announced to 
meet reduced 2021 budget 
• Identified some assets for sale to generate cash 








• Research Office communicated directly with 
national research grants bodies 
• Lead researchers communicated with contract 
research funders 
• Engagement Office communicated with 
philanthropic donors 
Government Policy and regulation 
compliance 
• University liaised daily with national and state 
government, including the Department of Health 
• Offered staff and laboratories to help in COVID-19 
testing and production of hand sanitiser 
 
In relation to these and other decisions taken, the overwhelming sense derived from the 
period leading the faculty during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic was the unrelenting 
demand for numerous decisions to be made and explained under intensive time pressure, and 
the near insatiable demand for information, in an environment of rapid change. Information 
was being received from the federal government, the state department of health, local health 
authorities, international authorities such as the WHO, and the university’s central 
administration. Sometimes there were contradictions, and often there were gaps in information. 
Getting things right was an ideal in direct conflict with pressures to act. Going slow was not an 
option. In this crisis, people could die, or in the least become seriously ill, if decisions were not 
made and information was not provided in a timely manner.   
Leadership and management also required careful balancing of interests. For example, 
decisions such as whether to shut a laboratory or clinic, or cancel classes, had to be cognizant 
of the differing impact on multiple stakeholders. With some laboratories involved in infectious 
disease research and others transitioning their efforts to large-scale COVID-19 testing based 
on next-generation DNA sequencing and bulk production of hand sanitiser, a full shutdown as 
recommended by some was not necessarily the best decision for society. Transparency had to 
be balanced with privacy in cases of staff or students reporting contact with someone who 
tested positive to COVID-19. Pragmatism, such as terminating casual contracts related to 
cancelled classes, had to be balanced with consideration of human welfare and workforce 
loyalty, knowing that many of the same people would be needed once the crisis had passed. 
Phrases such as “a tough day at the office” were recorded several times in the author’s journal, 
along with the confessional statement “We hurt a lot of people today”, referring to the tension 
between sustainable operational management and human welfare.  
 
4.1 Learnings for crisis leadership, management, and communication 
Reflection and discussion with faculty executive colleagues in FET meetings (an example of 
accessing private information through ethnography and autoethnography) afforded or 
confirmed a number of learnings for leadership and senior management, including the 
following. 
 
(i) Leaders and senior managers have to be agile and capable of processing and weighing up 
large amounts of information from multiple sources to make decisions. For example, 
advisories from health authorities were frequently updated, sometimes several times a day, 
requiring adjustment to operations and regularly updated communication with 
stakeholders.  
(ii) Accessing and processing large amounts of information required systematic and multi-
level monitoring. While traditional and social media monitoring, which is emphasized in 
much crisis communication literature, revealed public crisis narratives including 
disinformation and politicized discourses, it was necessary to closely monitor the websites 
of relevant authorities to access official information and to monitor e-mail that reflected 
the questions and concerns of employees and other key stakeholders.  
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(iii) Leaders and senior managers need to be visible and engaged, particularly with employees 
and closely connected stakeholders such as customers (students in this case). Despite the 
health risks, staff and students of the faculty expected to see and hear from their leaders 
on a regular basis. This aligns with international studies that show ‘leading by example’ 
as the public’s highest expectation of leaders (Moreno et al., 2018: 94). As Deputy Dean, 
and Acting Dean in a key period, the author was present in the faculty office from 7 am on 
week days and available on video conferencing applications such as Zoom and a cell phone 
24/7. Even when physical distancing and working from home were implemented, the 
faculty executive team maintained a roster of senior executives on site given that some 
operations continued because the faculty was declared part of an essential service. ‘Walk 
arounds’ to laboratories and occupied offices undertaken by the author and other members 
of the FET were greeted with enthusiasm and gratitude by staff members, with frequent 
comments such as ‘Thank you for coming to see us’ and ‘It’s good to see someone from 
management’. 
(iv) Crisis management teams (CMTs) need to be small and centrally located, as large and 
dispersed management teams become difficult or impossible to coordinate and lose 
consistency of messaging, leading to conflicting advice and chaos. The composition of the 
CMT and its operation are discussed further in a following section. 
(v) Leaders and senior managers need to speak directly, frankly, and authentically to 
stakeholders—not through statements written by human resources (HR), marketing 
departments, or through media releases. ‘Communicating in an open and transparent way’ 
has been identified as the second most cited public expectation of leaders after ‘leading by 
example’ (Moreno et al., 2018: 94). Implications of this for public relations, marketing, 
and other functional units are discussed further in the following. 
 
On 30 March 2020, just two and a half weeks after declaration of the pandemic, a long-
serving senior academic staff member in one of the faculty’s research centres committed 
suicide at home. While the staff member had a history of mental health problems, the news 
caused shock and grief among colleagues, as could be expected. It also was personally 
upsetting and confronting for the faculty’s senior executives including the author. But urgent 
empathetic communication was required with staff in the research centre, as well as the staff 
member’s family, so personal emotional responses had to be put to the side. Fortunately, the 
faculty’s leaders had support from psychologists in the university’s HR department. However, 
stress and the effects of stress are factors to be considered in crisis communication. In addition 
to this very upsetting incident, other examples of stress and their effects are reported later in 
both personal reflections and comments from faculty executives (see Section 4.8). 
A number of specific findings that inform crisis management and crisis communication 
theory and practice emerged from first-hand ‘lived experience’ followed by reflection and 
review of documents and records. The most noteworthy findings are reported in the following, 
together with additional personal reflections and insights. 
 
4.2 Crisis type expansion 
First, none of the crisis types identified in SCCT were directly relevant for the university faculty 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The flow-on effects of the pandemic were not intentional or 
accidental on the organization’s part, and the organization was not directly a victim of an event 
such as a natural disaster, rumour, product tampering, or hacking. It is also unlikely that the 
SCCT crisis types would be relevant for other organizations at the centre of the crisis, such as 
the World Health Organization (WHO). Victim and accidental crisis types were the closest fit, 
but their descriptions in SCCT (Coombs, 2015: 264) did not fully align with the situation. This 
suggests that crisis types as defined in the literature need to be broadened, as suggested by Boin 
et al. (2017).  
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This is not simply a matter of updating or expanding the range of crisis events that are 
recognized. The attendant crisis responsibilities listed in SCCT were found to be inapplicable 
and even misleading. Even though the organization studied could be deduced to have very low 
or minimal crisis responsibility according to the closest match crisis types, in fact it carried 
substantial responsibility in the minds of its staff and students, as well as society given that the 
university is a prominent public institution. Any wrong step in management and 
communication during the crisis could have caused heightened fear and even panic; triggered 
large-scale withdrawal from courses causing additional financial losses; disrupted socially 
important scientific research; and even cost lives, which would have severely damaged the 
reputation of the organization and lost the trust of staff and students. 
A university faculty is not alone in this larger concept of crisis responsibility. For example, 
fire services and local government authorities were not responsible for the 2017 Grenfell Tower 
fire in London and, prior to the event, they enjoyed a favourable reputation (i.e., no negative 
intensifiers). But they were the subject of major criticism for their failure to evacuate the 
building once it was clear that the fire was out of control and for a lack of communication with 
residents during the crisis. An independent report castigated the fire services (Moore-Bick, 
2019). This suggests a need for a broader understanding of crisis responsibility, which in turn 
necessitates a rethink of crisis response strategies. Being ‘to blame’ for a crisis is not 
necessarily the primary determinant of crisis responsibility. 
 
4.3 Crisis response strategies for broader crisis responsibilities 
 
The crisis response strategies identified in SCCT—namely denial, diminish, rebuild, and 
bolstering—were mostly irrelevant to the organization studied and are likely to be so for large 
numbers of other organizations that are not implicated under SCCT’s conceptualization of 
crisis responsibility. Only some bolstering strategies such as thanking and praising stakeholders 
for their help and support (ingratiation) and reminding stakeholders that the organization was 
not the cause, but a victim (victimage), were applicable in this case. 
SCCT is primarily focused on responsibility related to the cause of a crisis and thereby 
fault, which leads to blame and reputational damage. In this case, responsibility was interpreted 
much more broadly by stakeholders, as noted above. Irrespective of attribution of crisis 
responsibility related to the cause of this crisis (which for the university was nil), stakeholders 
were highly dependent on the university and the faculty making timely and wise decisions to 
protect their health and safety, as well as balancing mitigation strategies with sustainability of 
teaching and research and, ultimately, financial sustainability. Also, key stakeholders such as 
staff and students expected a fast flow of accurate information, as well as two-way 
communication to hear their concerns and answer their barrage of questions. 
This contradicts SCCT’s claim that victim crises result in ‘very low attributions of crisis 
responsibility’ and that accidental crises result in ‘minimal attributions of crisis responsibility’, 
with only the intentional crisis cluster leading to ‘strong attributions of crisis responsibility’ 
and ‘severe reputational threat’ (Coombs, 2007c: 168; 2015: 264). A helpful approach might 
be to separate crisis responsibility from fault and blame, with a much wider range of 
organizations having responsibilities in today’s networked and interconnected world. 
Lack of intentionality, accidental crisis events, and even victimage do not provide 
inoculation from responsibility and potential reputational damage. For example, during this 
crisis, two leading scientists in the faculty were outspoken and highly critical of the university 
and the faculty when they considered management was not moving quickly enough to close 
facilities. One called faculty leaders ‘irresponsible’ in a Zoom conference (MW, 20 March 
2020, personal communication). Another said in an e-mail: ‘Management was too slow to act’ 
(NS, 27 March 2020, personal communication).6 Employee, student, media, and public 
expectations of the university and its Faculty of Science were high, even though it played no 
part in creating or spreading the COVID-19 virus. 
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Many, if not all organizations, carry an expectation of responsibility during many crises. 
The level and type of responsibilities vary in accordance with the role and functions of the 
organization. This suggests that at least one additional crisis type should be recognized, which 
could be called ineffectual in terms of stakeholder and public expectations irrespective of direct 
responsibility.  
 
4.4 Blowing up the ‘media myth’ 
A third operational learning in this crisis that challenges SCCT and much public relations 
literature on crisis management and crisis communication (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2007), as well as 
many studies of risk communication (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005), relates to the role of news 
media. While news media, particularly TV, radio, and online news sites, played a key role in 
transmitting health information to the public during the pandemic, news media were found to 
be untrustworthy, ineffective, and their use was deemed even counter-productive for crisis 
communication with the organization’s key stakeholders. 
National and local news media mainly focused on the announcements of political leaders, 
reports of infections and death rates, ‘big’ stories such as stranded cruise ships, and 
controversial issues such as statements by Donald Trump. While news conferences and 
briefings by health authorities were reported and some practical information such as hand 
washing instructions was distributed, many media reports were inaccurate and sensational, 
rather than providing reliable and important instructing and adjusting information as required 
in crisis communication (Coombs, 2015: 265). The role of media may be different in the case 
of regional and specialist media. But even these suffer from the following limitation. 
A second reason that news media are of declining importance is that their audience reach 
has reduced substantially, particularly among young people (Galan et al., 2019. Furthermore, 
trust in media has plummeted to unprecedented levels (Edelman, 2020). In short, news media 
do not have the reach or credibility required to communicate with many key stakeholders 
during a crisis. The centrality of media, particularly traditional media, to SCCT and in public 
relations theory generally is increasingly a dated and narrow approach and warrants review. 
Social media are widely used across large sectors of society today, but these platforms also 
were identified as having limited effectiveness in crisis communication. Social media analysis 
showed that social platforms were rife with misinformation and disinformation including 
conspiracy stories and fake cures during the COVID-19 crisis (McAweeney, 2020). The World 
Health Organization (2020b) declared COVID-19 an ‘infodemic’ as well as a pandemic, and 
the United Nations referred to it as a ‘disinfodemic’ (Posetti and Bontcheva, 2020), largely due 
to social media content. While social media facilitated social connection between staff and 
students during extended periods of working and studying from home, which arguably 
contributed somewhat to personal wellbeing, social media were found to be unreliable channels 
for communication by the organization. 
In addition to the university’s online learning management system (Canvas) to which all 
course materials were transferred in an unprecedented effort, the most used and effective 
communication channels for the faculty and the university during the crisis were: 
 
(i) Video conferencing applications including Zoom and Microsoft Teams, which were used 
by faculty leaders to communicate directly with staff during physical distancing and 
remote working from home. This included special ‘Zoom Ins’ in which staff members 
could ask questions of senior leaders and managers in open forums; 
(ii) E-mail listservs for targeted messages to academic, technical, and administrative staff; 
international students; and domestic students; 
(iii) Intranet pages containing extensive information about remote teaching and remote 
working, as well as health and wellbeing. Along with video conferencing, the university’s 
and faculty’s intranet was a prime communication channel, with weekly and often daily 
updates posted to crisis-related pages during the period; 
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(iv) Web site home page messages and special pages containing information such as changed 
student enrolment procedures and dates; 
(v) Dean’s e-newsletter that was written personally by the Dean and Deputy Dean; 
(vi) Telephone for direct personal communication with major partners, funders, and also 
employees and students who reported symptoms or became infected with COVID-19.  
 
During the peak of the crisis, the organization avoided news media and social media for 
the reasons identified. No media releases were issued and no media news conferences were 
held. Owned media in the context of the PESO model (paid, earned, shared, owned) provided 
reliable channels in which accuracy, relevance, and timeliness could be guaranteed. Much of 
the use of these channels occurred via mobile applications and devices. This suggests that crisis 
management and crisis communication literature that continues to place a heavy emphasis of 
traditional news media needs updating from a technological and strategic perspective. As Kent 
urged in 2010, ‘crisis research needs to move beyond the myopic focus on external 
communication to the media’ (2010: 708). This study affirmed Taylor and Kent’s (2007) 
taxonomy of mediated crisis response in which they identified the central role of organizational 
websites in crisis communication, but this too can be extended to include more focus on 
intranets, extranets, and direct digital communication. 
 
4.5 Internal and interpersonal  
The preceding reflections and the summary of key management initiatives in Table 2 reinforce 
two other much-discussed principles—the importance of internal organizational 
communication and interpersonal communication. While many actions necessarily focussed 
on external stakeholders including customers (students), research funders, and government, 
internal communication was at the top of the list for management and communication, 
particularly in the early stages of the crisis. Without its workforce, an organization cannot 
deliver its services and products. In this case, mobilization of a superhuman effort was required 
to transition a large, mostly traditionally taught curriculum to online learning. Furthermore, 
teaching staff are a primary communication channels to students. Therefore, employees were 
the first priority in communication, and equal first with students in risk mitigation measures. 
While correspondence via e-mail, listservs, and the intranet was inevitably necessary for 
scalable communication, interpersonal communication was expected by staff and trumped 
textual communication in most situations. This was particularly so following stressful events, 
such as the suicide of a staff member; implementation of staff reductions in late 2020; and 
announcement of further staff redundancies to occur in 2021. In addition to staff expectations 
of face-to-face engagement with senior executives despite physical distancing requirements, 
website URL access data gained from Google Analytics showed that real-time face-to-face 
video technologies gained much higher levels of staff and student engagement than e-
newsletters and intranet pages – often by a factor of 10:1. 
However, as the crisis wore on into the second half of 2020, screen fatigue—or what some 
called ‘Onlinitis’—became evident through staff feedback and student surveys. Long hours 
sitting and looking at screens in Zoom and Microsoft Teams meetings and in classes were 
reportedly causing back and eye strain, particularly for those working on small notebook 
computer screens. A student survey conducted in May–June 2020 found that a majority of 
students wanted to return to face-to-face classes as soon as possible (University of Technology 
Sydney, 2020a). 
 
4.6 CMT structure – Public relations and the ‘dominant coalition’ 
The relatively low importance of news media, and stakeholder feedback revealing expectations 
that leaders and senior managers should speak directly, frankly, and authentically to 
stakeholders, informed the structure of the crisis management team (CMT). In contrast with 
Coombs’s claim that ‘public relations plays a critical role in the crisis response by helping to 
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develop the messages that are sent to various publics’ (2014b: para. 31), key messages and 
statements were directly crafted by senior university and faculty executives, and it was deemed 
essential that they spoke in their own voice. For internal communication, advice was taken 
from HR specialists in relation to matters such as sick and carer leave provisions, and because 
of the high priority given to the physical and mental wellbeing of staff and students. For 
example, free confidential counselling services were offered in all communications. Health and 
safety managers were also involved in all discussions, and IT technicians were essential to the 
CMT given the reliance on owned IT infrastructure. External communication with other 
stakeholders was also undertaken directly by senior executives via e-mail, telephone, and 
videoconferencing. 
The faculty and university public relations professionals are responsible for writing and 
distributing media releases and web content in relation to staff and student achievements such 
as awards and grants, and they support marketing in student recruitment. However, during this 
extended crisis, the public relations staff of the university were sidelined because of the 
“paradox of the positive”, which Johnston et al. (2020, p. 1) identify in relation to emergency 
management communication. This refers to the need for organizations and their 
communication staff to over-emphasize their preparedness and capacity to deal with 
emergencies and crises in order to create stakeholder and/or public confidence and avoid panic, 
which results in a predominance of positive and promotional information. Also, the widely 
reported focus of public relations on persuasion and promotion (e.g., Moloney, 2006; Watson 
and Noble, 2007, p. 14) was evident in drafts of statements and staff presentations that were 
rejected in favour of frank direct address by faculty executives. While professionally produced, 
public relations materials were mostly found to be inappropriate in the crisis because of their 
overly positive and promotional tone.  
The university’s and faculty’s senior executives resolved to speak ‘from the heart’ to all 
stakeholders with no ‘gilding of the lily’. Also, the rehearsed and ‘air-brushed’ image of 
spokespersons typically curated by media trainers was perceived as inauthentic. The most 
positive staff engagement, evidenced in the number of log-ins to Zoom briefings, online 
comments, and informal feedback to unit managers and staff supervisors, resulted from 
university and faculty leaders appearing online wearing a T-shirt, often from their home, 
speaking unscripted. Instead of a backdrop of executive office walls and journal-filled 
bookshelves, they often spoke from their lounge rooms, sometimes with children or pets 
walking through the background.  
The reported shift of public relations towards integration with marketing (USC Annenberg, 
2018) is likely to exacerbate a loss of authenticity. While practices vary around the world, this 
analysis argues that public relations associated with corporate and organizational 
communication needs to clearly distinguish its practice from marketing and promotion, and re-
orientate towards authentic open communication with stakeholders in order to play a 
substantial role in crisis management and communication.  
Experience during this crisis also confirmed the finding by Heide et al. (2018: 464) that 
‘an organization’s communication function and its activities only represent a very small 
proportion of the communication carried out in and by that organization’. This suggests that 
studies of crisis communication need to look well beyond the public relations or corporate 
communication team. 
 
4.7 Re-conceptualizing the future, rather than re-establishing the past 
A further observation and experience relates to leadership versus management. While 
managers focussed on stabilizing the organization and re-establishing ‘normal’ operations, the 
organization’s senior leaders’ group (the most senior executives) established a project in mid-
2020 to rethink the future and revise the organization’s Strategic Plan. The brief was to explore 
new ways of working, including increased online learning on a permanent basis balanced 
against preferences for face-to-face contact, and to develop new products to meet needs and 
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opportunities created by the pandemic. From this perspective, the crisis was a catalyst for 
change; disruption was to be embraced rather than mitigated. Communication of this initiative 
and its messages to stakeholders posed challenges, as it embroiled the FET in the ‘paradox of 
the positive’ – talking positively and even evangelically when people were losing their jobs 
and livelihood. Even when the need for and inevitability of change was accepted, the term “the 
new normal” became common in operational plans and discussions, reflecting a desire for an 
end to instability. The tension between normalization and innovation in the face of disruptions 
and crisis conditions is a subject to be explored in future research.  
 
4.8 Other lessons from ‘lived experience’ 
A final deeply personal reflection is relevant in honestly and frankly reporting the ‘lived 
experience’ of the crisis. Over the course of 2020, I noted an increase in my level of alcohol 
consumption, evidenced first in household spending records and then in weight gain and a 
decline in physical fitness. Physical fitness was exacerbated by reduced exercise that resulted 
from working days that started early and frequently extended into the evening. Meetings and 
international conferences that were traditionally attended physically became online 
engagements, sometimes at 1 am or 2 am because of time zone differences. Also, discussion of 
legal issues and risks related to contract terminations resulted in e-mails at all hours and on 
weekends, interrupting home life.  
To explore whether health effects were common among the faculty’s senior executives, 
the author raised the matter in a FET meeting (a closed-door confidential forum). This revealed 
that a number of the senior executives were dealing with both physical and mental health 
concerns linked to stress and long working hours. Almost all agreed that the stress of being 
positive in the face of highly negative experiences, in order to maintain morale and motivation, 
was a challenge. Several reported sleeplessness caused by having to announce and implement 
staff redundancies. One stated: ‘Telling staff that their jobs are going is not a nice feeling. 
These are good people’ (Anon, 2 November 2020, personal communication). Also, anti-
management sentiment frequently expressed by staff took a toll, but was only reluctantly 
acknowledged. ‘Suck it up’ and ‘if you can’t take the heat, stay out of the kitchen’ were mantras 
expressed. One executive acknowledged that ‘you mask the pain’ (Anon, 2 November 2020, 
personal communication).  
Mental as well as physical health has rightfully received increased attention in workplaces 
and the welfare of staff and students was a major focus in this instance. But this experience 
revealed that senior executives were not taking care of themselves, and the risk of ‘burn-out’ 
and mental ill-health at the top of organizations are hidden risks in crises. This is arguably an 
area for further research and interventions as part of crisis management and communication. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This study supports suggestions to expand crisis communication theory beyond the ‘managerial 
bias’ noted by Waymer and Heath (2007) and the narrow focus on apologia and reputation 
protection discussed by Arendt et al. (2017). Specifically, it suggests that an expansion of 
SCCT is needed to include at least one additional crisis type that recognizes failure of an 
organization to meet stakeholder and/or societal expectations even when it is not at fault 
through intention, or by accident, or involved as a victim. This additional crisis type could be 
called ‘ineffectual’ and applied to organizations that are a ‘downstream participant’. In today’s 
connected globalized world with increasing demands for corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and commitment to social purpose by organizations including corporations (Business 
Roundtable, 2019), all organizations need to respond to crises beyond their control and their 
borders. Being at fault, and the presence of intensifiers such as a history of poor performance, 
does exacerbate reputation damage and trust erosion, and requires strategies such as apologia 
and remedial action. But ‘innocent’ and blameless organizations cannot be bystanders during 
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a crisis, or enjoy diminished expectations because they are victims. All organizations attract 
expectations from their stakeholders and need to live up to stated commitments. For example, 
employees of all organizations, whether private or public, expect their employers to keep them 
safe at work. Emergent strategic communication (Heath and Johansen, 2018) claims to serve 
the interests of stakeholders as well as the organization and, as noted previously, many 
organizations including private and public companies are looking beyond growth and profits 
to have a social purpose (Rodríguez-Vilá and Bharadwaj, 2017). 
In so arguing, this analysis supports a proactive as well as an expanded approach, such as 
that applied in risk communication and risk management, rather than the mainly reactive 
approach associated with crisis communication that mainly responds to events an organization 
caused, or suffered from, with a primary focus on protecting its reputation. While recognizing 
difference between risk (potential injury or damage) and crisis (a manifested risk), the proactive 
and macro-societal approach of risk communication and risk management offers much to 
expand the contemporary relevance of crisis communication theory and practice, particularly 
pre-crisis communication that can contribute to preparedness. 
While a number of studies reveal a focus on the use of news media and social media as 
primary communication channels in a crisis (Coombs, 2015, 2018; Fearn-Banks, 2002; 
Verhoeven et al., 2014), this analysis suggests that the literature needs to be updated to take 
account of the increasing range of technologies available to create and support owned media. 
At the same time, the substantial decline in the reach and influence of news media and the 
attempts of many to retain audiences through clickbait, sensationalism, and opinion appealing 
to populism (Macnamara, 2020), give further weight to the case for owned media in which the 
fidelity of information and messages can be assured. However, screen-based digital 
communication needs to take account of screen fatigue and be balanced with the human need 
for physical interaction. 
Public relations can potentially play a significant role in crisis management and 
communication, but only if the practice facilitates authentic communication and is 
technologically up to date and proficient. Findings of the global Communication Monitor 
studies that ‘coping with the digital evolution’ and ‘dealing with the speed and volume of 
information’ are among the leading challenges faced by PR and corporate communication 
practitioners (Meng et al., 2019), along with reports that only 50 per cent have high levels of 
competence with communication technologies (Zerfass et al., 2020: 81), are of concern in this 
regard. Also, the long-standing debate about whether PR should align with marketing has 
implications. 
Benefits for the diverse field of practice are likely to accrue from interdisciplinary and 
even transdisciplinary integration of public relations theory on crisis communication, risk 
communication, and the hybrid field of crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC). A 
broader focus beyond the crisis types and events identified in SCCT, and beyond protection of 
an organization, is imperative to align with the principles of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), social licence to operate, and social purpose. Risk communication, and potentially 
emergency communication practices, could benefit from relational, dialogic, and sociocultural 
concepts of public relations to engage interactively and collaboratively with stakeholders, 
rather than traditional broadcasting of risk and emergency information and messages. Such 
integration would open up the field and offer new avenues for research. 
Beyond the numerous studies of leadership style, the leadership-management nexus during 
crises offers further interesting directions for study, including the balancing of normalization 
versus ‘futurization’.  
Finally, the use of ethnography and autoethnography, particularly from an emic (inside) 
perspective, is advocated for the deep insights drawn from first-hand lived experience that these 
methodologies provide, along with exposure of the affective (emotional) dimensions 
undetected by rational cognitive analysis.   
 




This analysis is based on examination of crisis communication in one organization of a 
particular type, which could be argued to be atypical. While the reported ethnography and 
autoethnography are supported by records such as minutes of meetings, archived e-mails, 
website and intranet statistics, and staff feedback, corroborating independent external evidence 
was not available due to the confidentiality of discussions with government authorities and the 
lack of time to engage external advisers or evaluation during the crisis. Also, this was not seen 
as necessary given the expertise available in the university. However, the efficacy of the 
approach taken is supported by post-hoc data such as end-of-year student satisfaction levels 
equal to or higher than previous years (University of Technology Sydney, 2020b); maintenance 
of domestic enrolments for 2021; and a lack of any public or media criticism of the university 
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Syndrome (SARs) and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERs). 
2  Natural disasters are defined as “catastrophic events with atmospheric, geological, and hydrological origins” 
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